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A LEFT OF LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF
TRUMP’S “BIG” WIN
PART ONE: NEOLIBERALISM
Duncan Kennedy*
This will hopefully be the first of three short pieces about the election, dealing here with the role of neoliberalism, then with “political correctness,” and
lastly with resistance.

The question of interpreting Donald Trump’s election, in liberal discourse,
is mainly “how can he have won, given that he is racist and sexist?” The answer of many of my friends is that he won because his racism and sexism appealed to a shockingly large part of the electorate, confirming that “our whole
society is sexist and racist.” According to the liberal conception, this is particularly true of the non-college part of the electorate, which had more “traditional”
(racist and sexist) values and less cognitive ability to figure out that he was going to screw them. If they were not racist and sexist, they would have rejected
him outright, no matter how much they didn’t like Hillary. I think class, race
and sex were key to everything, but in a different way than in that account.
It’s hard to argue with the more careful, liberal-Democratic account in
which the answer to the question “why is he president?” is that the swing states
just barely tipped to Trump in spite of Clinton’s solid victory in the popular
vote. Why did that happen? The outcomes in Pennsylvania, Michigan, Wisconsin, etc. were so close that many situational factors could have been enough to
determine the outcome.
Race figures in this analysis not as a general characteristic of the electorate
but as one factor among many. The suppression of black votes in swing states
is one of the things that could have made the difference. Another is Trump’s
“dog whistle” to serious white supremacists, which probably helped turn out
previous non-voter racists. But at the same time we can attribute it to Comey,
or to taking the rust belt for granted, or to Russian hacking, or to “the treacherous liberal media,” to Hillary’s personal weakness as a candidate, or any number of others, maybe even Bernie. Or all of them together.
Then there is the “structural” factor: white, non-college voters are
overrepresented in swing states compared to the country as a whole, giving
their rational and irrational resentments an accidentally outsized importance in
this particular race. Last, African-Americans voted overwhelmingly for Clin* Emeritus professor of law, Harvard Law School.
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ton, but in nothing like the numbers for Obama, and it is hard to see voter suppression as explaining the whole effect.
Which factor we choose to focus on is not about the “true” cause, but about
what we think is important in terms of our larger agenda. My larger agenda is
to understand the race/gender/class dynamics of the current situation in order to
get a sense of what the future is likely to hold in terms of perils and possibilities. In big terms, I want to argue the election did not signal a major shift to the
right of American political consciousness, but it did signal a rebellion (not a revolt), by many non-college-educated whites in red states, swing states, and red
pockets in blue states; against both political parties.
According to The Upshot, “Mrs. Clinton won Mr. Obama’s white working
class supporters by a margin of only 78 percent to 18 percent.”1 While racism
and sexism were definitely major factors in the election and in American society in general, they do not come close to explaining how Trump won Obama’s
sure thing swing states, and 62 percent of white non-college women.2
The large shift in voting by non-college-educated whites was, at least in
part, plausibly a protest against the long running, shared neoliberal policy
agenda of Democrats and Republicans that has “devastated” (just as Trump
said) their communities. It was also plausibly a protest by non-college educated
whites with “traditional values” against the particular way of enforcing liberal
values that is loosely and pejoratively called political correctness.
I don’t think these rebellions are any more “the” cause of the outcome than
Comey’s last minute intervention, but I think they are more interesting and
more important for understanding the possibilities of resistance than the more
situational factors.
I.   NO MAJOR SHIFT TO THE RIGHT
The election did not see significant changes in the balance of voting power
among different political tendencies. The overall pattern of voting was similar
to what it has been for the last many elections, with the country divided between red, blue, and swing states. Elections in the U.S. are close. The swing
states, including some that pollsters had thought blue, went for Trump but by
such small margins that the swing was much smaller than Clinton’s popular
vote margin.3
That margin was possible in spite of an increased Republican vote in many
red states because Hillary increased the Democratic vote in solid blue states,
1

Nate Cohn, Turnout Wasn’t the Driver of Clinton’s Defeat, N.Y. TIMES (MAR. 28, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/28/upshot/a-2016-review-turnout-wasnt-the-driver-ofclintons-defeat.html [https://perma.cc/GD6L-WHGU].
2
Clare Malone, Clinton Couldn’t Win Over White Women, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov. 9,
2016, 7:16 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/clinton-couldnt-win-over-white-women
[https://perma.cc/8BDQ-CHQS].
3
Tim Meko et al., How Trump Won the Presidency with Razor-Thin Margins in Swing
States, WASH. POST (Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/20
16-election/swing-state-margins [https://perma.cc/QQM6-GFBK].
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especially California and New York.4 At the micro level, within all states,
“purple” counties (split between red and blue) continued to disappear at a surprising rate. Today, 61 percent of voters vote in counties that went for one candidate or the other by 60 percent or more, compared to 39% in 1992.5 Moreover, “between 1992 and 2016, the share of voters living in extreme landslide
counties quintupled from 4 percent to 21 percent.”6 In other words, the main
shift was the intensification both at the state level and at the county level of the
geographical polarization of the electorate.
The Republicans now control all federal branches and completely or partially control many state governments in red states. But there are many more
red than blue states, and the Democrats completely or partially control state
government in the populous, rich, culturally-dominant East and West coastal
states. American federalism involves what, to Europeans, looks like massive
delegations of power to the states, limiting the practical ability of the central
(Trumpist) government to impose policy downward. Nonetheless the shift in
state power at the national level, as opposed to electoral support, may give the
Republicans/Trumpists a chance to change the electoral balance for the future.
And the shift in state power has already permitted them to inflict major sometimes irreparable harm on the vulnerable across the social spectrum.
II.   REBELLION OF NON-COLLEGE-EDUCATED WHITES AGAINST
“DEVASTATION”
To my mind, the shift in voting by non-college whites is the most interesting development of this cycle because of what it says about race and gender
politics in the U.S. now and in the future.
The first interesting piece of evidence was the 538 column on districts in
swing states that flipped from Obama to Trump or from Romney to Clinton.7
The study claimed that the thing that explained the flips was educational level,
not income, with non-college districts going toward Trump and collegeeducated ones going toward Hillary8. The number of such districts was not
large; most districts everywhere voted Republican or Democratic as they had in
previous elections. Flipping is rare.

4

Compare 2016 Presidential Election Results, POLITICO (Dec. 13, 2016, 1:57 PM),
http://www.politico.com/2016-election/results/map/president [https://perma.cc/F7Y7-YQG
P] with Presidential Election Results, NBC NEWS (Apr. 3, 2017, 2:02 PM), http://elec
tions.nbcnews.com/ns/politics/2012/all/president/#.WOKOOhjMy8o [https://perma.cc/Z26
Y-Q7FS].
5
David Wasserman, Purple America Has All But Disappeared, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Mar. 8,
2017, 11:33 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/purple-america-has-all-but-disappear
ed [https://perma.cc/NY8R-4GK9].
6
Id.
7
Clare Malone, Clinton Couldn’t Win Over White Women, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov. 9,
2016, 7:16 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/clinton-couldnt-win-over-white-women
[https://perma.cc/HA48-TZAP].
8
Id.
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A further study suggested that there were indeed many voters who flipped.9
But to explain the change in the outcome in swing states, two more significant
factors were: first, that many non-college white voters who had voted for
Obama did not turn out for Clinton or voted for third party candidates and, second, that many non-college whites who had not voted in 2012 turned out to
vote for Trump.10 Non-college voter participation stayed close to constant, but
the balance of enthusiasm and apathy shifted—red intensity overwhelming blue
abstention.
Why would non-college whites vote for Trump instead of for Hillary? One
part of the answer might be that they were voting against Hillary for the same
reason they voted against Bush and Kasich in the primary. In other words, not
because Trump was a Republican, but because he was trashing the dominant
policies of the Democratic-Republican, neoliberal consensus. From this point
of view, a crucial moment was his question to Hillary: you’ve been here for 25
years and what have you accomplished?
My liberal, and especially feminist, friends thought this was a truly bizarre
charge: Hillary is one of the most accomplished human beings on the planet, as
they understand it. But I think the meaning was that, in spite of progressive
rhetoric supposedly favoring the weak and marginalized, liberal Democrats led
by Hillary, Bill, and Obama, whether in power or out, have not managed to
stem large losses—social, economic, cultural—to the people whose votes
Trump was after.
This is about the “devastation” claim Trump made in the inaugural address.11 The claim is obviously false if understood as “Hillary has accomplished
nothing at all” or “America is devastated.” The point is nothing has been accomplished for a specific subset of non-college-educated whites. It makes no
difference that unemployment is down to four percent nationally. The claim is
about something that has been happening in particular, distinct locales. That
things are going better or even very well in other locales just makes it worse.
Red states and red areas in blue states have larger poor, white, non-college
populations than blue states and blue areas in red states.12 They are concentrated in areas that are post-industrial (read rust belt), or areas with declining agri-

9

Philip Bump, The Counties That Flipped Parties to Swing the 2016 Election, WASH. POST
(Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/11/15/the-count
ies-that-flipped-parties-to-swing-the-2016-election/?utm_term=.956a9c17e95c [https://perm
a.cc/F2UR-MZUN].
10
Konstantin Killibarda & Dana Roithmeyer, The Myth of the Rust Belt Revolt, SLATE (Dec.
1, 2016, 3:59 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2016/12/
the_myth_of_the_rust_belt_revolt.html [https://perma.cc/J8MZ-F3UM].
11
Daniel Dale, Trump Casts Himself as America’s Savior in Fiery Inaugural Address,
THESTAR.COM (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2017/01/20/donaldtrump-inauguration.html [https://perma.cc/R264-RSRA].
12
Neil Irwin & Josh Katz, The Geography of Trumpism, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Mar. 12,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/13/upshot/the-geography-of-trumpism.html [http
s://perma.cc/35S2-YM8B].
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cultural employment.13 Those areas are losing population to the (relatively)
new, rapidly developing, economically diversified, megacities on the coasts and
in the sunbelt, in both red and blue states.14
In declining areas, there are fewer and fewer high-paying, blue-collar jobs
(manufacturing, construction, transport, agriculture, etc.), and low-skilled farm
labor is long gone.15 Wages for this group have been stagnant or have actually
gone down over the last thirty years. Jobs for people (mainly women) who have
some college are also scarce because the main expanding areas of well-paid,
white-collar jobs (e.g. health, education, finance, insurance, real estate, government) are in the megacities.16
A declining population with a declining economic base sets up a classic
pattern of center-periphery unstable equilibrium. Think of southern Italy in relation to northern Italy. The center lures away the money of prosperous people
and the most ambitious and competent of the young, inducing a downward spiral in the periphery and fueling the ascent of the center. This dynamic, taking
place in the world of “traditional values” about gender and sexuality, generates
an accompanying process of “social decay.”
No jobs for high school graduates means unstable unions, especially when
women are staying in school longer and have better job prospects. Norms of
early and life-long marriage, and of shotgun marriage instead of abortion, are
changing surprisingly rapidly. Divorce is now much more prevalent in this
group than among the blue-state college educated.17 More and more couples
never marry. Single parenthood is becoming the norm rather than the exception.
No jobs for high school graduates sharply reduces the incentive to finish,
or to study where it isn’t required in order to stay in school. Dropping out or
just very bad performance by the weakest students (mainly guys) further reduces the employability of the young since good jobs require more, not less, education. The opioid crisis is not some bizarre anomaly in a musical-comedy, happy
Midwest, but a key aspect of an emerging culture of dysfunction.

13

Agricultural Workers: Employment Outlook Handbook, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
https://www.bls.gov/ooh/farming-fishing-and-forestry/agricultural-workers.htm [https://perm
a.cc/UPM6-STPC] (last visited Apr. 13, 2017).
14
Population and Migration Overview, ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/rural-economy-population/population-migration
[https://perma.cc/B29P-TUVZ] (last visited Apr. 13, 2017).
15
Justin Fox, Farewell to the Blue-Collar Elite, FORBES (Apr. 6, 2015), https://www.bloom
berg.com/view/articles/2015-04-06/factory-worker-wages-are-nothing-special-these-days
[https://perma.cc/5SXJ-HXSN].
16
Joel Koltkin, The U.S. Cities Creating the Most White-Collar Jobs, FORBES (July 21,
2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/joelkotkin/2016/07/21/the-u-s-cities-creating-the-mostwhite-collar-jobs-2016/#1bf0557f22be [https://perma.cc/LQ9V-SDJD].
17
Divorce Rate in the U.S., NAT’L CTR. FOR FAMILY AND MARRIAGE RES., BOWLING GREEN
STATE UNIV., https://www.bgsu.edu/ncfmr/resources/data/family-profiles/anderson-divorcerate-us-geo-2015-fp-16-21.html [https://perma.cc/8LHN-G73Z] (last visited Apr. 3, 2017).
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The crucial books here are Robert Putnam, Our Kids,18 from the left, and
Coming Apart,19 by Charles Murray (yes, him), from the right, surprisingly in
agreement that there is a white, ex-working class increasingly isolated from
what is happening to everyone else and trapped (that is the word) at the bottom.
But even where it is just decline, rather than “devastation,” they agree that the
biggest change from the 1950s for non-college whites is the virtual disappearance of upward social mobility. A high school diploma was once an indicator
of promise; now, without more it indicates “no prospects.”
In short, for this group, even Trump’s much mocked evocation of a golden
American past is right on point. I think what has happened to this group is really bad. The victims certainly deserve part of the blame for their fate. A “traditional values” response to the crisis—say by banning sex education and abortion—seems wildly counterproductive; locating the problem in big government
or affirmative action or immigration likewise.
But I don’t think the white, ex-working class deserves what has happened
to them, even if racist and sexist attitudes and utterances and practices are more
common (o.k., much more) there than among their college-educated counterparts. I think it was logical—if not justifiable—for non-college, white voters in
these particular deindustrialized or declining agricultural locales to vote for
Trump.
He was equally contemptuous of Republicans and Democrats. Just maybe
he intended to change whatever it was in the policies of both parties for the last
few decades that had at least allowed, and maybe had actually produced, the
“devastation” that they felt was obvious and undeniable.
III.   NEOLIBERAL POLICIES CAUSED THE DEVASTATION
Of course, phenomena like devastation are always causally overdetermined, just like the election outcome. And there is always the question of
when we should regard an actor’s mere “failure to act” as a cause of bad things
happening when it is not certain whether action would have made a difference.
We choose to focus on particular active or passive behavior as a cause for reasons of moral judgment and according to our own action agendas.
I think the single most important cause of devastation has been the adoption of “neoliberal” policies, equally by Democrats and Republicans, in and out
of office, since approximately the Carter Administration. Nixon was the last
president with a strong, affirmative model of state intervention to stabilize the
system and inflect its growth. I certainly prefer the nicer Democratic neoliberal
policies, but for the question of devastation I think they are equally to blame.
I don’t think neoliberalism is a philosophy. I think of it as a set of policies
that collectively eliminated particular regulatory structures that had produced
relatively evenly distributed growth, leaving many other regulatory structures
18
19

ROBERT PUTNAM, OUR KIDS (2016).
CHARLES MURRAY, COMING APART (2012).
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in place. Rather than a coherent vision of “the market,” the drivers of policy
change acted from a correct estimate that there would be many gainers, above
all, and enormously the one percent for whom they acted. They had zero regard
(or less!) for the many losers.
While it is common to begin the policy list with the global dimension, our
devastation begins at home. Democrats and Republicans agree on a decentralized governmental structure that encourages states and municipalities to compete for private investment, and permits investors to move within and between
states, without any responsibility for consequences left behind. This is the single most important legal/policy reason for decline of the peripheral area.
Democrats and Republicans agree on a labor law regime that has shrunk
and disempowered organized labor, so that new developing areas can offer low
wages and worker passivity in comparison with declining areas, and workers
left behind have no legal power to slow or reverse the process.20
The deregulation of the financial system led to the concentration of economic power at the national level.21 The surviving giants—whether banks,
manufacturing companies, agribusinesses, or Walmart and the national chain
stores—used their power to eliminate smaller, less-mobile companies whose
prosperity was tied to local conditions.22 This freed them to make their own location choices according to their national profit calculus regardless of local
consequences.23 No more small-town downtown.
This set of policies might have set up the downward-spiraling centerperiphery dynamic even without globalization. The domestic economy is large
and diverse enough for neoliberal policies to produce “global” dynamics right
here at home. Already in the 1930’s, industry was beginning to flee the highwage, strong-union, blue cities of the Northeast for Georgia and North Carolina.24
During that same period, cheap cotton production in Egypt and India
threatened the global competitiveness of the American textile industry, which
depended on Southern cotton produced by cheap ex-slave labor. When the ruling planters and agribusinesses mechanized, they had enough power to throw
about seven million black people off the land with no alternative to migration
20

Julian Zelizer, How Labor Unions and Democrats Fell Out of Love, CNN (Aug. 31, 2014,
12:25 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/31/opinion/zelizer-labor-democrats [https://perm
a.cc/Z8BK-DR94].
21
Michel Chossudovsky, Global Financial Meltdown: Sweeping Deregulation of the U.S.
Banking System, GLOB. RES. (Oct. 17, 2008), http://www.globalresearch.ca/global-financialmeltdown-sweeping-deregulation-of-the-us-banking-system/10588 [https://perma.cc/9MX5G2CY].
22
Stacy Mitchell, The Impact of Chain Stores on Community, INST. FOR LOCAL SELFRELIANCE (Apr. 18, 2000), https://ilsr.org/impact-chain-stores-community [https://perma.cc/
26VL-G65E].
23
Contrast an earlier pro-small-business, antitrust philosophy and successful resistance in
Japan.
24
DANIEL R. FUSFIELD & TIMOTHY BATES, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE URBAN GHETTO
(1984).
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northward. But . . . the industries that provided them unskilled jobs on arrival
were just beginning to relocate from inner cities to the suburbs. The government subsidized this move in many ways, from mortgage credit to transport,
and guaranteed its segregation. The poorer they got, the less the abandoned inner cities could compete for jobs with low tax white suburbs.
By the seventies, when the migration slowed, the new ghettos had their
own spiral of economic deprivation combined with socio-cultural shock, with
the same indicators as in today’s non-college, white, marginalized areas. As
with those areas today, the departure of African Americans with a chance in the
post-civil rights, college-educated sector left the ghettos with “concentrated
poverty.”25
The racial spiral occurred before neo-liberal policy thinking had become
hegemonic. The progressive wing of the Democratic Party with some liberal
Republican allies argued for policies that would have, albeit just mildly, countered the center-periphery dynamic. Richard Nixon’s racist “southern strategy”
successfully mobilized white fears against them. Left liberalism was over with
Ted Kennedy’s loss to Carter in the 1980 primary and Reagan’s triumph.
At the same time, global neoliberal policies have certainly been a major
factor in the devastation story. I think these are the ones that have counted the
most:
The American red and blue elites collaboratively designed and implemented a liberalized world economy, reducing tariffs (and non-tariff barriers) and
creating a world capital market. Countries with low labor costs compete for direct and indirect foreign investment by multinationals and banks. This is the
basis of “outsourcing” from the US, eliminating jobs in declining areas. The
global regime is a close parallel to the American federal system in which rising
American states and municipalities offer American companies incentives for
relocation from declining areas.
The liberalization of trade with China produced a massive shift of manufacturing out of the US into Chinese factories, which sell us all kinds of consumer goods at prices dramatically lower than before the shift.
Permission, by non-action, of the immigration of millions of low-skilled,
relatively uneducated workers from Mexico, the Caribbean, and Central America, combined with technological change and massive government subsidies to
agribusiness, weakened the small farm town economy but increased productivity and dramatically lowered food prices. (Unskilled immigrant labor also obviously competes with unskilled black labor left behind in poor urban neighborhoods, with liberals in denial.) Liberals sometimes speak as though support for
immigration has been driven by human rights abuses, downplaying the dispossession of millions and millions of peasants by Latin American elites pursuing
their own domestic neo-liberal policies.

25

See generally WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED (1987); WILLIAM
JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS (1996).
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In this account, neoliberal political and legal projects, both domestic and
international, have reconfigured the U.S. economy into its present pattern of
red/blue/purple states and localities, and distributed non-college whites across
that landscape.
The reconfiguration, along with technological change, was the vehicle of a
dramatic, long-term rise both in GDP per capita and in household wealth. The
losses to the internal periphery have been no more than a small fraction, in dollar terms, of the gains in dollars to the people living in the centers of development. Those people include migrants from the internal American periphery
who escaped to a better life in the cities, and a large, post-civil-rights, black,
middle class. Moreover, the gains to perhaps a billion very poor people living
in the countries that now export to the US have been life-transforming.
IV.   BLUE AND RED ELITES SHARE POLITICAL/MORAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR
DEVASTATION
So what’s the problem? The neoliberal policies caused the good development and they caused its bad effects. Because they are socio-cultural as well as
economic, the bad effects go far beyond national trends of increased income
and wealth inequality, wage stagnation, and differential red/blue state growth
rates. They were concentrated on a subsector of non-college whites and the
black, urban poor. The devastation has been a long-running story, first predicted, then documented, then predicted some more, then documented some more.
The bad effects were not a necessary cost of the gains. In other words, we
could have had the gains of the transformation without the losses. The gains
were so large that it would have been possible, without changing any neoliberal
policy, to tax enough of them away from the gainers to fund large-scale attempts to halt or reverse peripheral downward spirals. Alternatively, it would
have been possible to alter many neoliberal policies at the micro level, selectively departing from free trade and domestic uncompensated factor mobility
(capital can’t just up and leave), to tilt toward losers. Or some combination.
Nothing like that happened. This is obviously another over-determined dog
that didn’t bark. Maybe it wouldn’t have worked anyway. Maybe American
racism means there is no possible populist coalition of black and white outsiders, and maybe that is, in spite of what I’ve just argued, the true lesson of the
election. It does seem that at some point on the road to Citizens United (no limits on campaign contributions to candidates and causes)26, those who gained the
most from the neoliberal transformation, namely the one percent, acquired a
lock on both political parties.
According to Paul Krugman, because no one had proved that Hillary did a
favor in exchange, it was outrageous to object to her millions of dollars in Wall
Street speaking fees. To left outliers, it seems obvious why she didn’t release
the transcripts: she was pledging her faith in “the market” as neoliberal policy
26

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).

Spring 2017]

INTERPRETATION: PART ONE

107

for everyone, rich and poor alike, and against “redistribution” synonymous with
“class warfare.” If your issue was devastation, it was reasonable to see this as a
more significant non-disclosure than Trump’s sleazy tax return concealment.
Suppose that it’s right that some interesting part of Trump’s switching noncollege, white votes, and of Hillary’s lost, no-show, white, non-college votes,
were in rebellion against the Republican/Democrat, red/blue state consensus,
from Bushes to Clintons. It seems clear already that nothing will come of it.
The Inaugural was a farewell. These voters are obviously powerless in relation
to the consensus. Only 40 percent of the electorate is white and non-college educated;27 the putative rebels are a minority of the minority with no consensus
about what’s wrong or what to do about it. In terms of resources, the whole
point is that the elites have reaped all the money and embedded institutional
power from the transformation.
I don’t think either party has a pragmatic reason to “learn from the rust belt
revolt.” Its success, if it was responsible for Trump, was an accident of the demographics of the electoral college. But Trump may have created a new opportunity. The big, rich, progressive blue states could tax back rich people’s reductions at the federal level and innovate at home. Before looking at the
implications of federalism for Trumpism, I turn now to the question of the “political correctness” issue in the election and its implications.

27

David Wasserman, Mapping the 2016 Electorate: Demographics Don’t Guarantee a
Democratic White House, COOK POL. REP. (June 19, 2015), http://cookpolitical.com/story/86
08 [https://perma.cc/AX2D-LQUL].

